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Abstract
Location information is generated in large 
quantities in the Internet of Things and becomes a 
major component of the big data phenomenon. This 
results in privacy issues involving sensing, 
identification, storage, processing, sharing, and use of 
this information in technical, social, and legal 
contexts. These issues must be addressed if the IoT is to 
be widely adopted and accepted. Theory will need to 
be developed and tested, and new research questions 
will need to be investigated. This exploratory research 
begins to identify, classify, and describe these issues 
and questions.
1. Introduction 
The interactions of The Internet of Things (IoT) 
and big data analytics are greatly impacted by location 
information and in turn greatly impact location 
privacy. We will examine the relationships between 
these four concepts with an aim toward furthering a 
framework for future analysis and research.
Location is a critical and often central component 
of context-aware computing [1] and similar notions of 
ubiquitous and pervasive computing [2].  In the past 
location privacy was of relatively little concern 
because location information was not pervasively and 
continuously available.  Now that technology has 
radically altered information availability, privacy of 
location is closely tied to controlling access to this 
information, and people want to be in control of the 
information availability [3]. Location privacy 
preferences are now quite well studied in the context of 
users carrying mobile devices [4] but not extended 
through an IoT context where device-to-device 
communication can carry location information far 
beyond users’ awareness.
Privacy concerns are becoming an increasingly 
critical issue in the IoT [5].  Without assurance of 
privacy in a world of interconnected sensors and 
systems, users will be unwilling to adopt these new 
technologies [6].  The International 
Telecommunications Union report on the Internet of 
Things notes that “Concerns about privacy and data 
protection are widespread, particularly as sensors and 
smart tags can track a user’s movements, habits, and 
preferences on a perpetual basis.” [7]
Despite its relevance and importance, privacy is not 
yet receiving adequate attention in the enthusiasm to 
exploit the technical capabilities of the IoT. A recent 
survey of IoT literature covering 127 journal and 
conference papers [8] finds only nine security and 
three privacy-related documents in its category of IoT 
challenges [9] [5] [10]. A recent survey of IoT context-
aware computing describes security and privacy as a 
major concern, yet finds only 11 of 50 surveyed 
research prototypes incorporating security and privacy 
functionality [11].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Sections 2 and 3 will review the IoT and big data as 
needed for following discussion. Section 4 will discuss 
theory and methods. Sections 5 and 6 will address 
location information and location privacy, respectively. 
Section 7 will discuss the implications of issues raised
and propose questions for further research.  Section 8 
is a summary.
2. The Internet of Things
Said to be coined as a phrase in 2009 [12] the IoT 
recognizes that the fastest-growing mode of 
communication on the Internet is not between 
communicating people but rather communicating 
“things”—sensors, actuators, and other devices and 
objects.  Early work on the IoT emphasized RFID as a 
source, and supply chain networks as the application, 
often defining IoT in similar terms, e.g., “The ‘things’ 
are physical objects carrying RFID tags with a unique 
EPC” [13] and “The Internet of Things (IoT) is an 
emerging global Internet-based information 
architecture facilitating the exchange of goods and 
services in global supply chain networks.” [13] More 
recently its context and scope have been considerably 
expanded and the IoT’s core concept is said to be that 
“. . . everyday objects can be equipped with 
identifying, sensing, networking, and processing 
capabilities that will allow them to communicate with 
one another and with other devices and services over 
the Internet to achieve some useful objective.” [8]
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The IoT is an evolving construct.  The networking 
firm Cisco has proposed an even broader concept
called the Internet of Everything (IoE) [14].  The IoE is 
said to connect people, data, processes, and things in a 
network that combines machine-to-machine, person-to-
machine, and person-to-person communication.  Cisco 
predicts US $19 trillion in economic value for the IoE 
by 2020.  Applications are seen in retail, 
manufacturing, and the public sector. Also building 
upon a IoT base is the proposed Web of Things (WoT)
[15].  The WoT extends the IoT by exploiting Web 
technologies and standards to bring together a wide 
variety of smart devices into “physical mashups,” 
including lightweight ad-hoc systems that may be 
rapidly created and torn down as needed.
An example of recently introduced components in 
the IoT are devices aimed at home automation and 
control. In June 2014 Honeywell International 
introduced a Wi-Fi, Internet-accessible thermostat [16]
controllable by smart phone and compatible with 
Apple’s HomeKit [17].  Honeywell also makes smoke 
detectors, window sensors, and other connectable 
devices, and Apple’s HomeKit is intended to promote 
interoperability between multiple vendors and 
numerous devices including lights, locks, and cameras.
This comes partially in response to the innovative Nest 
thermostat [18], and suggests a vibrant and competitive 
market for not only devices but standards and protocols 
for interoperability.
3. Big data analytics and management
Big data is often described in terms of Vs—
Volume, Velocity, and Variety [19]. Some add 
additional Vs such as Veracity and Value [20] [21].
Volume, Velocity, and Variety issues and examples are 
briefly reviewed below.
3.1. Volume
The worldwide volume of data creation is 
increasing dramatically, from an estimated 1 zettabyte 
(1021 bytes) in 2010, to 7 zettabytes in 2014, possibly 
to reach 35 zettabytes by 2020 [22]. Until now, much 
of this data was created through relatively conventional 
means—for example, Walmart creates more than 2.5 
petabytes of data per hour from customer transactions
[19]. New sources of data from “edge” devices such as 
sensors and smartphones are now contributing to the 
rapid increase in data sources.
Examples of large data volumes abound. In 2012 
the company Renew installed sensors in London 
recycling bins which recorded MAC addresses of 
phones and other devices with Wi-Fi turned on [23].
In a trial of 12 such bins, on the single day of July 6, 
2012, 946,016 presences were detected, corresponding 
to 106,629 unique MAC addresses and presumably a
correspondingly large number of passersby (although 
an individual person may carry more than one device 
with a MAC address and there are issues involved in 
mapping devices to persons). [23] A company 
spokesman estimated that 80% of people leave Wi-Fi 
on when leaving their home or office.  In a salient 
example of inferencing capabilities possible through 
multiple sensors, the company proposed placing 
sensors in rest rooms, so that each MAC address could 
be associated with the gender of the person carrying 
the device.  In August 2013 the City of London 
requested that the trail be halted, although the company 
claimed the devices recorded only “extremely limited, 
encrypted, aggregated, and anonymized data.” 
Modern smart electricity meters can collect high-
resolution energy consumption data, and this can 
facilitate identification and usage patterns of household 
appliances.  Already this has been exploited to the 
extent that specific television programs have been 
detected by monitoring the electrical usage patterns 
caused by various display technologies that vary power 
consumption according to material shown. [24] One 
captured communication between this smart meter and 
a utility company server contains 955 characters (an 
HTTP 1.1 POST with Content-Length 851, plus header 
information, uncompressed) [24]. The data is sent 
every two seconds. Assuming eight bits per character, 
the resulting bandwidth is 955 * 8 / 2 or 3820 bps. 
Storing the data would result in approximately 40 MB
per user per day, and 15 GB per year.  If implemented 
on the more than 200 million households in the EU, 
annual storage would be approximately three exabytes
(3 * 1018 bytes).  This can be compared to an estimated 
2.5 exabytes of global data created each day in 2012, 
or about 900 exabytes per year. [19]
Of course recent revelations about data collection 
by the US National Security Agency have also brought 
to light the unprecedented volumes of data that can and 
are being collected by national governments. In 2012, 
there were at least 41 billion total records collected and 
stored by XKeyscore (a system that intercepts Internet 
traffic including emails, Web addresses, social media 
posts, and more) in a single 30-day period. [25] It is 
speculated that the total storage at one new million-
square-foot NSA data center in Utah will hold one 
yottabyte (1024 bytes, equivalent to one thousand 
zettabytes or one million exabytes) or more in storage 
[26].
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3.2. Velocity
Both people and devices are producing data at 
unprecedented rates today.  While data rates (volume 
per time period) are important, the latency and rapid 
possible response times are equally critical.  For 
example, the Twitter social networking service 
averages some 6000 tweets per second, with a recent 
record of over 143,000 tweets in a single second on 
August 3, 2013 [27]. This means that analysis of 
topical trends can updated on a sub-second response 
time.
Data rates from devices vary greatly depending on 
the type and precision of information in use—even 
relatively simple automotive GPS systems provide 
location updates several times per second. Movement 
tracking is an example of how a sequence of location 
fixes can result in high-velocity information streams as 
the changing locations can also lead to the updating of 
maps and other information in the local context.
High velocity also supports continuous, real-time 
processing and decision making in business.  
Historically credit card companies might batch 
together occasional offers to potential customers via 
mass mailings prepared over several weeks. Today 
offer processing time has been reduced to a day, and in 
cases where Web and call center activity can be
monitored continuously, personalized offers can be 
made in milliseconds [28].
3.3. Variety
Variety of big data is evident starting with sources 
of data, including sensors, appliances, social network 
sites, mobile phones, and many other devices with 
sufficient connectivity to share and store data. While 
commercial examples abound, it is also instructive to 
consider examples that begin as simple consumer 
goods but expand based on the addition of an ever-
enlarging set of components and interactions between 
them.  One such system is IFTTT.
IFTTT (“If This Then That”) [29] is a simple rule-
based system that has become popular for controlling 
the interaction of smart and connected devices. Various 
“channels” have been defined for particular devices 
and services, each with antecedent “triggers” and 
consequent “actions.” Simple programs called 
“recipes” relate the triggers and actions.  For example, 
one recipe specifies that an incoming email from a 
specific address will cause a Philips Hue connected
light to blink as a notification. To date there are 
already more than 100 IFTTT channels [30].
IFTTT recipes can be chained together, leading to 
potentially unpredictable control and information 
sharing scenarios. It is notable that even simple recipes 
can introduce risk if used incautiously—for example, 
there is a shared IFTTT recipe triggered by a Netatmo 
temperature sensor that will turn on a space heater 
plugged into a Belkin WeMo remote-control electrical 
outlet. [31]
It is also becoming more common to integrate 
physical devices and sensors with human social 
networks in ways where each supplies input to the 
other [32] [33]. GPS location information in mobile 
phones and automobiles is generated on a physical 
device, but is typically most relevant as a proxy for a 
person’s location, and may automatically feed into 
human social networks. In the other direction posts to 
a social network such as a stated intent to leave work 
early may lead to actuation of physical devices such as 
adjusting a home thermostat. Existing systems such as 
Google Now [34] monitor a user’s email, Facebook, 
location, airline reservations, and more in order to 
predict the user’s immediate and future needs.  
3.4. Analytics and management
There are many implications of data analytics for 
privacy, for location analysis, and for the combination 
of the two, affecting location privacy. The length of 
time that consumers are willing to travel to shopping 
malls, for example, has been used to measure 
consumer demand [35].  Interpersonal social 
relationships and friendships have been accurately 
predicted by monitoring the locations of mobile phones 
[36]. The ubiquity of the IoT has also resulted in a call 
for its integration with cloud computing, resulting in 
the Cloud of Things (CoT) [37] [38].  Quantities of 
devices and volumes of data are said to be too large 
and too valuable to only store locally, therefore the 
CoT will allow for global utilization.  Sensing as a 
Service (SaaS) is proposed as facilitating a ubiquitous 
computing environment, further enhancing the volume 
and availability of IoT data [21]. Of course global 
availability implies possible global exposure, therefore 
adding to the importance of security and privacy 
safeguards [37].
4. Theory and methods
The present work is an informational component in 
the early stages of theory development and in the 
broader context of the scientific process [39] rather 
than application of an existing theory or hypothesis 
testing.  It follows and borrows from prior work 
investigating issues in the development of location 
privacy theory in general [40], and extends it to the 
particular environment of the IoT. 
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Theory construction has five desirable goals 
(reproduced from [41]):
1. A method of organizing and categorizing 
“things,” a typology;
2. Predictions of future events;
3. Explanations of past events;
4. A sense of understanding about what causes 
events; and occasionally mentioned as well:
5. The potential for control of events.
At this early stage we can hardly purport to fully 
explain and predict the eventual evolution of the 
recently-emerged IoT, let alone control it—however 
we can begin to organize and categorize important 
“things” such as components and concepts.
Consistent with the above, a number of strategies 
may be used to construct theories, one of which is a 
classificatory strategy seeking a taxonomy of elements 
both within and outside the phenomenon [39].  In early 
stages of theory construction, classification strategies 
are particularly important and a prerequisite to other 
strategies [42].  This approach follows 
recommendations from related fields [43], emphasizing 
discovery and description, where key research 
questions are “Is there something interesting enough to 
justify research?” and “What are the key issues?” in 
both cases with categorization suggested as a 
procedure to be used [43] (page 324).
The methods described below will attempt to 
discover, classify, and describe a number of key issues 
that relate the IoT and big data to location privacy, and 
justify the need for additional research.
5. Location information
While early and basic IoT approaches began with 
networks of sensors and actuators, for our purposes it 
is useful to flesh out the possible information flows and 
address them in somewhat more detail. System-wide 
information privacy cannot be ensured only through 
controls on individual elements, but rather must be 
considered in light of overall communication flows.
Table 1 shows six phases of location information flow, 
along with example components and methods 
associated with these. The phases are only partially 
ordered; sensing necessarily precedes identification, 
but storage, processing or sharing can follow in any 
order, or direct use of the information may be made 
with little storage, processing, or sharing. The phases
are briefly described below.
x Location sensing may be accomplished by four 
main methods. Triangulation is the method used 
by cell towers (in the absence of GPS) with 
angular and time-of-arrival information. Scene 
analysis uses cameras and pattern recognition. 
Proximity uses signals such as Bluetooth or Wi-Fi 
to sense nearby transceivers. Indirect inference 
deduces location by observing correlated activities 
and events such as a garage door opening implying 
presence of an automobile and driver.
x Identification may be accomplished by detection of 
various unique identifiers.  These may be 
Bluetooth or Wi-Fi addresses (e.g., MAC 
addresses), or any of a large number of standards-
based or proprietary identifiers such as an iPhone 
unique identifier (UDID), Android device ID, etc.  
Availability of this ID information via broadcast 
or query depends upon several factors including 
vendor implementation details and user settings 
and preferences. Of course each of these methods 
depends upon a consistent mapping of sensors and 
devices to persons in order to identify human 
individuals and groups. A more direct form of 
identification is facial recognition, which can scan 
large crowds and in some cases has reached higher 
performance levels than human counterparts [44].
The location of recognized individuals is imputed 
from the location and viewing characteristics of 
the camera(s) used.
x Stored location information is itself considered 
metadata in some contexts such as photographs, 
however it has its own associated metadata as 
well. This may include absolute or relative 
external references, estimated accuracy, and more.
It is outside the scope of the present work to 
discuss all implications of the object/meta aspects 
of such information, but it is worthy of note that 
the relative importance of each is not fixed but 
rather dependent on context (for example—in an 
emergency telephone call, either the caller’s 
description of her location or the reported GPS 
location of the phone may be more valuable,
depending on the particular context).
x Processing of location information may be 
relatively self-contained (e.g., a GPS-enabled 
device computing its own location, direction, and 
speed from received satellite signals) or it may 
depend on communication with additional systems 
and data analytics. In cases of multiple and/or 
communicating systems, the possibilities are very 
large—as is evident from police reports of 
tracking fugitives via locations of credit card 
charge, convenience store security cameras, toll-
booth license plate scanners, and much more.
x Sharing of location information may be intentional 
or unintentional.  Intentional sharing may be 
accomplished through apps such as Apple’s Find 
my iPhone and Android’s Find my Friends apps.  
Unintentional sharing is undoubtedly much more 
common, as a large majority of mobile device 
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users are not able or concerned with ensuring that 
their privacy settings are configured to prevent 
unintended sharing of information.
x Use of location information may likewise be 
classified into broad categories of intentional or 
unintentional use. Customers of car rental agencies 
may be pleased with the capabilities of their GPS 
navigation systems for way finding, but upset if 
they receive a speeding ticket due to the system 
detecting their vehicle speed and comparing it to 
posted speed limits at their various locations.
5.1. Increasing significance of location 
information
Strong trends in the IoT include further 
enlargement of the type and number of devices, greater 
affordability and marketplace availability of devices, 
and incorporation of sensing capabilities in devices that 
are already sold in large numbers. Apple’s iBeacon is a 
recently-announced capability that can be enabled in 
many existing Apple iPhones without additional 
hardware, and can locate users of compatible devices 
within a few inches, using Bluetooth low-energy [45].
Apps in iOS 7 or later can define regions based on 
proximity to beacons (generally but not always 
stationary devices) and regions associated with those 
apps are monitored continuously, even when the app is 
not running [46]. It is estimated that half the top 100 
US retailers will begin testing iBeacon beacons in their 
stores in 2014, and that beacons will be in more than 
30,000 indoor locations by the end of 2014. Beacons
will cost as little as $2 each by 2015 [45].
It may not be widely appreciated that stationary 
devices often have associated location information, and 
that this information is potentially useful, possibly 
sensitive in a security and privacy sense, and 
potentially one link in an inferential chain that may 
have much wider privacy implications. For example,
most computer networking devices such as switches 
and routers hold a standardized MIB (Management 
Information Base) variable called sysLocation, which 
is defined as “The physical location of this node, (e.g., 
‘telephone closet, 3rd floor’) [47]. This variable is 
typically queried via SNMP over a network. While 
device locations are necessary and useful for finding 
and repairing equipment, the location information itself 
clearly should be kept private for security reasons.
Most wireless access points may be configured 
with this MIB location information, and hence the 
location of associated users of mobile wireless devices 
such as laptop computers may be inferred via the 
location of their associated wireless access point.  
Similarly, other fixed devices such as smart 
thermostats are not necessarily inherently location 
aware, however if they connect to a Wi-Fi network 
their location may be inferred from the location of the 
wireless access point.  Furthermore the location of 
devices such as smartphones they interact with may be 
location-aware, and the relationships between the 
devices may be exploited in location-aware 
applications.  For example, iOS 8 and HomeKit can 
take advantage of “geofencing” [48] to set a thermostat 
to “home” mode when a homeowner is within a certain 
perimeter of the home, and “away” when outside that 
perimeter. Thus we see a chain of many links, passing
location information among devices, users, and 
applications.
6. Location privacy
Location privacy may be viewed from many 
conceptual perspectives [40] and in the context of the 
present work related to the IoT and big data, we will 
consider it from an informational privacy perspective.
The informational perspective is key to most privacy 
theories in a technological context,  describing privacy 
as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what 
extent information about them is communicated to 
others.” [49] (p. 7). In keeping with this approach, we 
will look at location privacy in terms of information 
flows, from sensing to use and including a number of 
other activities typically in between (including more 
complex interactions between flows).
Table 2 uses the six phases of information flow 
enumerated in Table 1 and identifies example privacy 
controls for each phase.  The six phases extend early 
work from more than 45 years ago identifying three 
phases of input, storage and output [49].  They also 
extend five phases discussed in [40] by explicitly 
adding the “processing” phase to acknowledge the 
important of inferencing capabilities and data 
analytical techniques that may deduce location from 
other available evidence. 
The privacy-enhancing controls fall into technical, 
social, and legal measures, represented in columns of 
the table. Technical controls are those that control the 
actual processing of the information and may block, 
filter, modify, etc. that information. Examples include 
authenticating, blocking, encrypting, and other privacy 
protections for RFID tags [50]. Social controls affect 
privacy information through the influence of accepted 
business practices, social norms, and similar non-
technical means.  These include not only such things as 
formal privacy policies from system providers, but also 
behaviors of system users, which have been found to 
vary considerably according to context such as who the 
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information is exchanged with, whether the person is at 
home or in a public place, and what means is used to 
share the information [51]. Legal measures are those 
that impose formal prohibitions or regulations on 
activities related to location information flows. These 
vary greatly by region.  In the EU the ePrivacy 
Directive directly addresses location privacy, while in 
the US federal law addresses location only indirectly 
and incompletely [52].
The six information flow phases and associated 
privacy controls are described below. Selected 
references are included in the text and in table cells.
x Sensing may be technically blocked by any means 
that prevents signal transmission or reception.  
This includes RFID-blocking wallets, RF blocker 
tags generating simulated or false RFID tags, etc.
Social norms may also inhibit sensing, merely 
through the opprobrium of those who object to the 
panopticon scenarios made possible through 
technologies such as Google Glass. A number of 
laws prohibit the use of sensing-capable devices 
such as cameras and cell phones at border customs 
stations, locker rooms, and other sensitive 
locations.
x Identification in the IoT has already received 
significant attention [10] [5]. A recent 
development of interest for technical identification 
privacy is the announcement that Apple’s iOS 8 
will identify itself with a software-generated, 
random MAC address rather than the more 
conventional approach of a unique and fixed 
address [53].  This will significantly inhibit 
tracking systems that rely on recognizing the same 
MAC address in multiple locations.  Social norms 
still often permit and on occasion encourage 
anonymity in letters to newspapers and postings to 
online discussion forums. Legal enforcement of 
anonymity is almost universally expected and 
enforced in particular contexts such as election 
ballot casting.
x Storage privacy is enabled through several 
technical methods, including merely not providing 
a storage facility and encryption of any stored 
data.  The Snapchat service was touted as an 
ephemeral means of photo sharing, but was 
quickly and easily defeated [54]. Social control of 
stored information is often accomplished (with 
varying degrees of success and user satisfaction) 
through user privacy settings in social media. 
Various jurisdictions may enforce formal legal 
restrictions on the type, amount, and duration of 
stored data. A “right to quantitative privacy” has 
even been proposed [55].
x Processing phase technical privacy includes a 
number of design principles that also apply to 
other phases [56] and various anonymizing and 
privacy-enhancing and privacy-preserving 
technologies [5]. It may also be affected on a 
social and free market level in software terms of 
service agreements.  Formal legal measures 
include prohibitions or restrictions on database 
matching and sharing of information between 
commercial entities.
x Sharing phase privacy may be technically 
implemented by restricting the communications 
channels available, e.g., not implementing or 
turning off facilities such as Bluetooth and Wi-Fi. 
Social measures are largely the responsibility of 
users to control application settings and follow 
recommended norms for appropriate sharing. 
Legal controls for sharing have recently received 
significant attention—for example the US Federal 
Trade Commission has just recommended that 
Congress give consumers more control over the 
data brokerage industry [57] and European courts 
have required that search engines implement a 
“right to be forgotten.” [58]
x Use of privacy-sensitive information can be 
technically controlled partly by blocking its 
importation into applications.  Most modern 
mobile device operating systems allow the user of 
an app to permit or deny the use of geo-location 
information by the app. Social controls on 
sensitive information are often governed by 
acceptable business practices and local norms. 
Legal restrictions are sometimes codified to 
prohibit discrimination, e.g., to prevent the 
practice of “redlining” where banks discriminate 
in granting mortgage loans based on locations and 
neighborhoods of potential borrowers.
There are interactions and inconsistencies in the 
above areas.  For example, UK law allows anonymous 
collection of MAC addresses, but restricts the use of 
Web cookies unless the user gives permission.  This 
leads to inconsistent net effects, since MAC address 
tracking is, in the view of the company tracking users 
via London recycling bins, “a cookie for the real 
world.” [59] With multiple sensors, device location 
tracking can reveal much more than a simple cookie, 
including the speed at which a user is traveling, how 
long they pause at a particular location, and detailed 
movement patterns.
7. Discussion
New technologies and their uses have always had 
complex economic, social, cultural, and legal
implications, with accompanying concerns about 
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negative consequences.  The newly-invented telephone 
was once studied in an attempt to determine whether it 
might make men lazy and break up home life [60].  Yet 
it was not banned, gained near universal adoption, 
created remarkable efficiencies and conveniences for
business and the public, and did not result in societal 
chaos.  So it will probably be with the Internet of 
Things, big data, and their use of location data and 
attendant location privacy concerns.
Location information is a major component in 
effective inventory and supply chains, in efficient 
transportation systems, in context-aware mobile 
applications, and numerous other systems. These 
advantages must be balanced against security concerns, 
loss of privacy, and potential abuse made possible by 
the technologies involved. In part it is a question of 
whether a change in quantity is a change in quality, and 
whether a change in degree is a change in nature.  
Some will argue that a traffic light camera that records 
the license plates of speeders (and hence their location 
and speed information as well) is merely the 
substitution of a camera for a police officer with a
radar gun and ticket book. Others will judge it a 
quantum difference, with continuous mass data 
collection posing a threat to personal rights and 
freedoms.
If one is concerned about location privacy in the 
context of the IoT and big data, then it’s appropriate to 
consider how the situation should be managed. 
Because of the partial ordering of phases we have 
discussed, where for example sensing must occur 
before identification, if one believes that technical 
means are a good approach to the problem, then one 
might favor the ability to configure devices in the IoT 
so that they cannot collect location information at all.  
If not collected, it cannot be shared; if not collected 
there is no further need to be regulated.  This approach 
favors controls in the top left cell of Table 2.
If one believes that location information’s benefits 
generally (even if not universally) outweigh their costs, 
or that the collection, storage, sharing, etc. of location 
information is inevitable, then one might favor moving 
to the opposite cover of Table 2 (bottom right) and 
concentrate efforts on legal controls of location 
information use.  This would be somewhat analogous 
to prohibiting health insurers from considering pre-
existing conditions in patients—the information is 
known to all parties but its use in particular contexts is 
strictly prohibited.
It must be recognized that management and control 
of location information privacy may not be sufficient 
according to traditional user and public preferences. 
Society may need to balance the benefits of increased 
capabilities and efficiencies of the IoT against a 
possibly inevitably increased visibility into everyday 
business processes and personal activities. Much as 
people have come to accept increased sharing of 
personal information on the Web in exchange for better 
shopping experiences and other advantages, they may 
be willing to accept increased prevalence and reduced 
privacy of location information.
7.1. Questions for further research
Many location privacy research questions suggest 
themselves as the IoT evolves, and many of them align 
well with the information flow phases and privacy 
enhancing controls discussed above.  Example 
questions, each of which may be translatable into 
families of formal hypotheses include:
1. What are the levels of user awareness
concerning location information associated the 
IoT, and what affects these levels?
2. What are the levels of user concern about 
disclosure and use of location information 
associated with them, and what affects these?
3. What are the types and levels of behaviors
adopted by users as a result of their location 
privacy concerns, and why are these adopted?
4. What are the differences in awareness,
concerns, and behaviors of the general public 
versus business entities (e.g., participants in 
supply chains) related to location privacy?
5. For particular privacy concerns in particular 
contexts, what are the preferred controls for 
location privacy?
6. For particular privacy concerns in particular 
contexts, in what phase of information flows is 
control preferable?
7. What location privacy issues most strongly 
affect users’ willingness to adopt particular IoT 
devices and features?
8. Summary
The Internet of Things and big data represent an 
explosion of information creation, sharing, and use.  
This is due to greatly increased types and numbers of 
connected physical devices such as sensors and 
actuators, and systems such as social networks used by 
people.  Because location information is a large 
component of IoT information, and concerns about its 
privacy are critical to widespread adoption and 
confidence, location privacy issues must be effectively 
addressed.
It is hoped that the framework presented here, 
which looks at six phases of location information flow 
in the IoT and three areas of privacy controls that may
be considered to manage those flows, will be helpful to 
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practitioners and researchers when evaluating the 
issues involved as the technology advances.
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Table 1: Internet of Things information flow 
Phase of information flow Example components/methods
Sensing Triangulation
Scene analysis
Proximity
Indirect inference
Identification Unique identifier detection
Facial recognition
Vehicle license plate recognition
Storage Object data
Meta data
Processing Self-contained inferencing
Communication and matching
Advanced pattern recognition and data analytics
Sharing Intentional
Unintentional
Use Intentional
Unintentional
Table 2: Internet of Things example privacy measures
Phase of 
information flow
Example technical privacy 
control
Example social privacy 
control
Example legal privacy control
Sensing RF blocking wallets
RFID blocker tags [61]
Socially acceptable uses for 
Google Glass [62]
Prohibition of cell phone and 
camera use at customs [63]
Identification MAC address 
randomization in Apple 
iOS 8 [53]
Anonymous letters to 
newspaper editors or postings 
to online discussion forums
“Secret” ballots for voting
Storage No physical storage
Encryption
Ephemeral storage
User social media privacy 
settings
Formal limits on amount and 
duration of stored data
Processing Privacy-enhancing 
technologies: 
anonymizing, etc.
Vendor-customer terms of 
service
Restrictions of database 
matching
Sharing Restriction or non-
provision of
communication facilities
User and application sharing 
settings
The “right to forget”
Data broker restrictions
Use No provision for input into 
applications
Accepted business practices 
and standards such as EPC 
guidelines [64]
Prohibition of discriminatory 
use
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